University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 43
Issue 3 Summer 2014

Article 4

2014

Comments: Avoiding Those Wearing Propeller
Hats: The Use of Blue Ribbon Juries in Complex
Patent Litigation
Jordan M. Halle
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons
Recommended Citation
Halle, Jordan M. (2014) "Comments: Avoiding Those Wearing Propeller Hats: The Use of Blue Ribbon Juries in Complex Patent
Litigation," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 43: Iss. 3, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol43/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

AVOIDING THOSE WEARING PROPELLER HATS: THE USE
OF BLUE RIBBON JURIES IN COMPLEX PATENT
LITIGATION.

I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary
condition of the law which makes it possible for a man
without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry
to pass upon such questions as these ... How long we shall
continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and
authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of
justice, no one knows; but all fair persons not
conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I
should think, unite to effect some such advance. l
I. INTRODUCTION

The current state of technology has led to the creation of patents for
previously unimaginable inventions. 2 These inventions are incredible
boons to society and mark significant scientific progress. To protect
their creations, inventors file for patents that, if granted, gives the
patent holder "the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States
,,3

However, while inventions as complicated as an engine the size of
a single molecule have been developed, the juries tasked with
analyzing claims to patents for such technology have not changed. 4
At trial, the parties are likely to call expert witnesses to attempt to
clarify complex scientific breakthroughs,s but the matter discussed
l.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95,115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
For example, chemists at Tuft University's School of Arts and Scientists recently
developed an electric motor comprised of a single molecule. Heather L. Tierney et
aI., Experimental Demonstration of a Single-Molecule Electric Motor, 6 NATURE
NANOTECHNOLOGY 625, 625-29 (2011). Such a motor could be used to power tiny
robots (nanobots) within the human vascular system, tasked with repairing damaged
tissues and delivering cancer-fighting drugs directly to a tumor. How Nanobots Can
Repair Damaged Tissue, INTRODUCTION TO NANOTECHNOLOGY (July 10, 2009),
http;llnanogloss.comlnanobotslhow-nanobots-can-repair-damaged-tissue.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(I) (2012).
See infra discussion accompanying notes 40-49.
See Rojas-Ithier v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto
Rico, 394 F.3d 40, 43 (Ist Cir. 2005) ("[A] factfinder normally cannot find causation
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may be so far beyond the comprehension, training, and experience of
the lay jury that rational fact-finding is rendered impossible. 6
To counter the potential for arbitrary decision-making, and to
create a fair jury for deciding patent cases, commenters have
suggested the use of "blue-ribbon" juries. 7 Blue ribbon juries
"consist[] of jurors who are selected for their special qualities, such
as advanced education or special training."s Nevertheless, in
implementing these specialized juries there is a tension between the
right to due process and the right to trial by a jury of one's peers.9
Part II of this comment discusses the hurdles faced by the blueribbon jury. In Part II.A, the tension between the Fifth Amendment
and the Seventh Amendment will be explored. Part II.B discusses the
difficulty inherent in empaneling a blue-ribbon jury in the face of the
fair cross-section requirement. Presently, jurisdictions differ as to
their preferred resolution of these tensions. lO

6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

without the assistance of expert testimony to clarify complex medical and scientific
issues ....").
After resolution of a case dealing with slight differences between patents for similar
hydrocracking catalysts, the jurors, two of whom were engineers, were asked about
their understanding of the facts. Joseph Sanders, Jury Deliberation in a Complex
Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. Sys. J. 45, 48 (1993). Said
one of the engineers: "Nobody else was at that level or even near that level [of
education], and.[the other engineer and I] were getting lost. Imagine what the poor
school teacher, or retired cop or farmer ... were [sic] feeling." Id.
See Kristy L. Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling For
Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. I,
I (1998) ("When two giant corporations engage in multi-million dollar litigation is it
fair to ask a millworker, school custodian, receptionist, plumber, nurse's aid,
housewife, and others possessing no expertise in economics or accounting, to render
an accurate verdict based on average variable cost determinations and tax
consequences of inventory accounting?"); see also LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling The
Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through Specialization for Internet Law and
Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. I, 99 (stating that, in
complex litigation, a jury composed of "scientifically sophisticated members" may
lead to more "fair" and "consistent" results).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 423 (4th pocket ed. 2011).
See discussion infra Part II.A.
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506 (1999) (providing for special juries), and In
re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1217
(S.D. Ohio 1985) (recognizing that the blue-ribbon jury is "separate and apart from
the rules of the United States District Court" and would only be empaneled if the
parties mutually agreed as to (I) the implementation of such a jury and (2) the area of
expertise from which to draw jurors), with In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411,
429-30 (9th Cir. 1979) ("We do not accept [the argument for blue-ribbon juries].
Jurors, if properly instructed and treated with deserved respect, bring collective
intelligence, wisdom, and dedication to their tasks, which is rarely equaled in other
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Subsequently, Part III provides an analysis of current shortfalls in
complex patent litigation that can be overcome by the use of blueribbon juries. Part lILA discusses the lay juror's lack of fluency with
the specialized languages in scientific fields as a hindrance to
decision-making. Part III.B looks at the present shift, in light of
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,ll towards allowing trial
court judges to interpret patent language as a matter of law, and how
the use of blue-ribbon juries provides a better alternative. The blueribbon juror's ability (or lack thereof) to wear the shoes of a person
having ordinarily skill in the art (PHOSITA) related to the patent is
discussed in Part III.e. Finally, Part III.D analogizes the blue-ribbon
jury to the death-qualified jury as a call for empaneling decisionmakers who are able to comply with the instructions of the law and of
the court. Throughout these sections, the ability of the blue-ribbon
jury to provide a better alternative is discussed.
II. HURDLES OF BLUE-RIBBON WRIES

A.

Tension Between the Right to a Jury Trial and Due Process
When Implementing a Blue-Ribbon Jury System

1.

The Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person shall. . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.,,12
Through the Fourteenth Amendment such due process protection was
extended to the states. 13 "Due process requires a competent and
impartial tribunal in administrative hearings. .. and in trials to a
judge .... "14 In Sullivan v. Fogg, a convicted defendant appealed his
denial of writ of habeas corpus relief to the Second Circuit Court of

11.
12.
13.
14.

areas of public service."}, and William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg,
Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping
With the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67VA. L. REv. 887,913-15 (1981)
(citing congressional hearings regarding the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
that indicate the purpose of the Act was to mitigate, if not eradicate, blue-ribbon
juries).
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, SOl (1972) (internal citations omitted); see also In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in
the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.").
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Appeals alleging violation of his due process protection because one
of the jurors "had a schizoid personality with paranoid features ...
[and was] vulnerable to a paranoid psychotic decompensation.,,15
The Second Circuit recognized that the "due process safeguards
which are designed to promote thorough and accurate factfinding"
should allow further inquiry as to the juror's competency and
reversed the denial of writ of habeas cOrpUS. 16
The inability of the jurors to understand the pleadings and
arguments during trial is the fundamental reason courts will sustain a
properly alleged due process violation when a juror is unable to
competently understand the English language,17 or otherwise dismiss
the juror upon proper motion,18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1865. 19 By
keeping those unable to understand the proceedings out of the jury
box, the courts are able to prevent juries from reaching arbitrary
decisions which can result in overturning a jury's findings on appeal
or by collateral attack. 20

15.
16.

17.

18.

19.

Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465,465-66 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 468.
Lyles v. State, 41 Tex. 172, 177 (1874) ("If the trial by jury is to remain a substantial
fact and an important right, and is not to be substituted by a legal fiction bearing the
name, but wanting in the most important qualification of a jury, namely, the capacity
to understand what the pleadings contain, what is said by the counsel in their
addresses to the jury, and utterly unable to comprehend the charge of the court, then it
is necessary that jurors unable to speak or understand the English language should be
excluded from the panel.").
See United States v. Paulk, 372 F. App'x 971,973 (11th Cir. 2010) ("The district
court's conclusion that juror Pierre Cadet's English was sufficiently limited to warrant
dismissal is supported by the record."); United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359, 1367
(4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1992));
Guam v. Palomo, 511 F.2d 255, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Silverman,
449 F.2d 1341,1344 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
This statute, titled Qualifications for Jury Service, reads in part:
(b) In making such determination the chief judge of the district
court . . . shall deem any person qualified to serve on grand and
petit juries in the district court unless he ... (2) is unable to read,
write, and understand the English language with a degree of
proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror
qualification form; [or] (3) is unable to speak the English
language.

20.

28 U.S.c. § 1865 (2012).
See Lester v. Dunn, 475 F.2d 983, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial Versus the
Complexity Exception

The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury for
suits at common law. 21 However, a complexity exception has been
carved out whereby "[t]he complexity of a case may justify the
refusal to grant a discretionary jury trial motion.,,22 This is because
the "primary value promoted by due process in factfinding
procedures is 'to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. ",23
3.

Japanese Electronic Products and the Third Circuit's Embrace
of the Complexity Exception

Prior to Japanese Electronics Products, there was no specific
precedent to uphold a complexity exception. 24 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that "[ a] jury that cannot
understand the evidence and the legal rules to be applied provides no
reliable safeguard against erroneous decisions.,,25 The Third Circuit
found it possible that giving an extraordinarily complex case to the
jury to decide would "violate due process and therefore would go
beyond the guarantee of the seventh amendment. ,,26 With that in
mind, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals suggests three factors that
may prevent a jury from properly understanding the content of the
trial:
[F]irst, the overall size of the suit,... ; second, the
conceptual difficulties in the legal issues and the factual
predicates to these issues, which are likely to be reflected in
the amount of expert testimony to be submitted and the
probable length and detail of jury instructions; and third, the
difficulty of segregating distinct aspects of the case .... 27
After enunciating this standard, the Third Circuit surmised that the
Seventh Amendment should only give way to the weight of due
21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

u.s. CONST. amend. VII.
Davis-Watkins Co. v. Servo Merch. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (M.D. Tenn. 1980),
affd, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982).
In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980)
(quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and COIT. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13
(1979)).
Id.
!d.
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1088-89.
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process in exceptional circumstances after a detailed examination of
the stated indicia of complexity.28

4.

In Re u.s. Financial Securities Litigation and the Ninth Circuit's
Rejection of the Complexity Exception

The mere proposition that one constitutional safeguard can be
disregarded in furtherance of another constitutional safeguard
through a judge-made law strikes some as abhorrent. 29 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the purported
complexity exception head-on in In re U.S. Financial Securities
Litigation. 30 The complexity arose, in part, from the consolidation of
eighteen cases representing five certified classes. 3! In dismissing the
call for a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment, the Ninth
Circuit was especially concerned with creating a slippery slope that
may erode the jury system. 32 Moreover, the U.s. Financial Securities
opinion suggests that other safeguards are in place to sufficiently
handle complex cases in which a jury verdict may be irrationae 3 or
hard to come by.34 In the end, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "in
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

/d. at 1089.
See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427-28 (1956) ("'If it be thought that the
privilege is outmoded in the conditions of this modem age, then the thing to do is to
take it out of the Constitution, not to whittle it down by the subtle encroachments of
judicial opinion."') (quoting Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir.
1954)); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1128-29 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("The arguments supporting denial of a jury demand in complex civil cases ...
are not appropriately submissible to judges sworn to uphold th[e] Constitution. To
permit a judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision that destroys another
constitutional provision is to place at risk the entire Constitution.").
In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
/d. at 411.
Id. at 431-432.
To overcome irrationality in jury findings, the Ninth Circuit explains that:
[a] new trial may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 when the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages are
excessive, or the trial was unfair for some reason. And, a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 may
be granted if there was not enough evidence to make an issue for
the jury. These procedures protect litigants from the risk of a jury
reaching an "irrational" verdict.

34.

Id. at 432 (internal citations omitted).
Methods for simplification of a complex trial noted by the Ninth Circuit under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include the following: motions under Rule 12,
judgments as a matter of law under Rule 56, separation of issues or claims under Rule
42(b), and, appointment of a special master under Rule 53. Id. at 428. Other methods
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view of the mandate of the Seventh Amendment, time might be better
spent in searching for ways to improve rather than erode the jury
system. ,,35

B.

Improving Rather Than Eroding the Jury System: Reconciling
Japanese Electronics Products and U.S. Financial Securities
Through the Use of the Blue-Ribbon Jury

The tension between the Seventh Amendment and Fifth
Amendment is most clearly seen where the trial court finds that
honoring the Seventh Amendment and protecting the right to a jury
trial would come at the cost of due process and lead to an irrational
decision. 36 Japanese Electronics Products and Us. Financial
Securities represent diametrically opposed ideologies in the approach
to handling complex litigation. 37 As a result, while the Us. Financial

35.
36.

37.

also include stipulations to admissibility of evidence, settlements prior to trial, and
summaries for voluminous evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006. Id. at
428-29.
Id. at 432.
Compare discussion supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing circumstances that might
necessitate use of the complexity exception), with discussion supra Part II.A.2.b
(discussing the rejection of complexity exception in favor of other due process
safeguards).
It is worth a note to explain that the complexity in Japanese Electronics Products and
U.S. Financial Securities came from both procedural and substantive complexity. In
Japanese Electronics Products, complexity arose from claims regarding the
Antidumping Act and antitrust violation laws. In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1073-75 (3d Cir. 1980). Review of the issues would require
the jury to effectively become accounting and marketing experts. See id. The size
and scope of the trial was also considered as adding to the complexity of the trial. Id.
at 1073. In U.S. Financial Securities, the complexity lamented in the trial court arose
from both the magnitude of the litigation and the complexity of the issues; said the
court:
The time and effort necessary to read and understand 100,000
pages comes a little into focus when one realizes that such a
quantity of paper forms a stack over forty feet high (as high as a
three-story building). In the alternative, one could say that such a
quantity of paper would completely fill five large filing cabinets.
Or, from a lawyer's perspective, reading those 100,000 pieces of
paper would be like sitting down to read the first 90 volumes of
the Federal Reporter, 2nd Series-including all the headnotes.
The fact finder will not only have to read, but will have to
comprehend, the contents of these thousands of documents. It will
have to analyze the USF accounts and the accounts of many
subsidiaries, not only as they exist, but as the plaintiffs contend
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Securities court fancies itself as the vanguard of the Constitution,
refusing to see the lapse of the Seventh Amendment,38 it is inevitable
that the Fifth Amendment suffers with such a position. Similarly, the
Japanese Electronics Products court believes it has found the best
solution to this problem by outlining a test with a high standard to
allow for a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment, thereby
protecting the Fifth Amendment. 39 Both of these approaches
inevitably sacrifice one constitutional safeguard in favor of the other.
The use of blue-ribbon juries represents an improvement rather
than an erosion of the jury system. While the public has often been
critical of the jury system,40 the abandonment of a civil trial by jury in
the majority of cases, as has been done in the United Kingdom,41 is
they should have existed. It will have to listen to, understand, and
remember-throughout the trial-months upon months of highly
technical and often boring testimony about various aspects of the
USF accounts, including the testimony of the various expert
witnesses who inevitably will be called by many of the parties to
give their theories of whether the accounting standards actually
used were correct, and, if not, what the correct standards should
have been. After receiving and evaluating all of the evidence, the
fact finder will then have to apply this mass of information to all
of the asserted causes of action, each of which is based on
different laws and different standards. The finder of fact must
consider, separately, the evidence pertaining to each of the 100 or
so defendants so as to reach a correct decision as to each. Finally,
the fact finder will have to figure out which of the 100 or so
defendants are liable to which of the plaintiffs, and which of those
defendants are consequently liable to which of the other
defendants who cross-complained, and for how much money.

38.
39.
40.

41.

In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411
(9th Cir. 1979).
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a.
"In recent years, juries increasingly have been criticized as being ill-equipped to
adequately decide the issues in the cases before them." Steven I. Friedland, Legal
Institutions: The Competency and Responsibility ofJurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw.
U. L. REv. 190, 190 (1991) (citing Jacoby & Padgett, Waking Up the Jury Box,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1989, at 51 ("[A] growing number of legal scholars think the
[jury] reforms would make for more reliable, accurate verdicts."». See generally
STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: DISORDER IN THE COURTS xvi (1995) (demonstrating
through multiple examples how jurors can be illogical).
Senior Courts Act, 1981, c. 54, § 69(1) (Eng. & Wales) (limiting the use of a civil
trial by jury before the Queens's Bench to cases involving "a charge of fraud ... ,
malicious prosecution or false imprisonment, ... unless the court is of opinion that the
trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or
local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury . . . . "); Piper
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not likely to find a foothold in America. Mark Twain, expressing
concerns similar to Judge Learned Hand,42 lamented upon what he
saw as a fault in the jury system over one hundred and forty years ago
in his semi-autobiographical book, Roughing It:
The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty,
and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity and
perjury ... Why could not the jury law be so altered as to
give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools
and miscreants? ... I wish so to alter it as to put a premium
on intelligence and character, and close the jury box against
idiots, blacklegs, and people who do not read newspapers.
But no doubt I shall be defeated-every effort I make to
save the country "misses fire.,,43
While Twain's concerns lack the politically correct prose of today,
his attempt to "save the country" reads as an early call for the blueribbonjury.44 Prior to the American Revolution, English courts
authorized the empanelment of professional juries.45 On these panels
sat citizens with experience or expertise pertinent to the facts at issue
in the trial. 46 Now, though, few courts will allow for the
empanelment of a professional jury,47 favoring, if anything, the
previously discussed complexity exception. 48
The use of a jury comprised of those steeped in the knowledge of
the field at issue may lead to the most favorable and fair outcome.
Taking an ideological extreme is hardly the best approach to a
problem as complex as the modem jury system. The blue-ribbon
jury, unlike the complexity exception, is a means of keeping the
issues of fact in the hands of the jurors. At the same time, like the

43.

Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) ("Even in the United Kingdom,
most civil actions are not tried before a jury.") (citing 1 GEORGE W. KEETON ET AL.,
THE UNITED KiNGDOM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS 309
(George W. Keeton & Dennis Lloyd eds., 1955».
See Park-Davis & Co. v. H.K.Mulford Co., 189 F. 95,115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
MARK. TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 343 (OxfordUniv. Press 1996) (1872).

44.

Id.

45.

46.

Bertelsen, supra note 7, at 10.
Id. at 10-11 (giving as example, matrons sitting on a jury charged with determining

47.
48.

Id. at 13-14.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a.

42.

the validity of a pregnancy claim).
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complexity exception, allowing blue-ribbon juries to decide complex
patent cases will result in more rational fact-finding. 49
C.

The Fair Cross-Section Requirement

One of the stumbling blocks to the empanelment of blue-ribbon
juries is the "fair cross-section" principle. 50 While leeway may be
given to the implementation of juror qualifications, the basic
principle is that those potentially empaneled on the jury be a fair
representation of the community.51 That principle has been codified
to give
all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury ... the
right to. . . juries selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community ... It is further the policy ... that
all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for
service on... juries in the district courts of the United
States. 52
The Jury Service and Selection Act of 1968 53 provides the statutory
basis for the fair cross-section requirement. 54 Additionally, the Act
provides a statutory cause of action to challenge a jury not taken from
a fair cross-section of the community. 55 This fair cross-section does
not necessarily require that any particular jury be a fair crosssection,56 but that the jury selection process implemented forestalls
the selection of a truly diverse jury.57 With that in mind, the
implementation of the blue-ribbon jury arguably would keep a
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.

See discussion infra Part III.
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,537-38 (1975).
See id. at 538.
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (emphasis added). Previously, the federal standard for jury
qualifications rested on the laws of the district in which the federal court sat. Thiel v.
S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 221 (1946).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1861.
Morro v. City of Birmingham, 117 F .3d 508, 518 (11 th Cir. 1997).
28 U.S.C. § 1867(e) (2012).
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,208 (1965) ("Neither the jury roll nor the venire
need be a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the proportionate
strength of every identifiable group."); United States v. Johnson, 386 F. Supp. 1034,
1035 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("[A] challenge to a particular jury because it consisted only of
white persons is without merit unless it can be shown that this district's jury selection
system fails to produce juries from a fair cross-section of the community.").
The Supreme Court, in analyzing cases of purported violations of the fair crosssection requirement, focuses on discriminatory selection processes. United States v.
Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 568 (1970) (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195
(1946)); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 220, 225 (1946).
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cognizable group-likely those with less than a four-year degreefrom sitting on a jury, thus violating the fair cross-section
requirement. 58
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not ruled against blue-ribbon
juries in the civil context,59 though they do violate the Constitution in
the criminal context,60 In Fay v. New York,61 decided before the
enunciation of the fair cross-section requirement, the Court
summarized the benefit of the federal system in exploring different
approaches to jury empanelment:
The states have had different and constantly changing tests
of eligibility for service. Evolution of the jury continues
even now, and many experiments are under way that were
strange to the common law. .. "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country. ,,62
This leeway for the states to experiment with different forms of
jury selection requires that "the jury lists or panels are representative
of the community.,,63 In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company, a
California jury venire was deemed unconstitutional because it
omitted daily wage earners.64 The Thiel court emphasized that
[r]ecognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for
jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury
competence is an individual rather than a group or class
matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To
disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and

58.

59.
60.
61.

62.
63.
64.

Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 10, at 914-15; see infra notes 66-(57 and
accompanying text.
Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence,
108 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1597 (1995).
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,529 (1975).
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), abrogated by Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538
("Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition ... but the jury
wheels ... from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive
groups in the community ....").
Id. at 296 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, 1., dissenting)).
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1946).
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discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals
of trial by jury. 65
It is inevitable that the selection of a blue-ribbon jury necessarily

requires drawing from a venire not generally representative of the
community. Nationally, out of 234,719,000 adults in the United
States over eighteen years of age, only 66,192,000 have attained a
bachelor's degree or above-about 28% of the population. 66 The
empanelment of a special jury for complex patent litigation, in which
case the greatest benefit comes from selecting a jury of those in a
particular field, would create an even less representative jury
venire. 67
This system inevitably undermines the democratic ideals behind
jury selection. 68 Nevertheless, as the discussion below will explain,
the lay jury is likely unable to come to anything but an arbitrary
decision when faced with complex patent litigation. 69 Where the fair
cross-section requirement grew from the desire to protect minority
defendants from a discriminatory jury,70 applying the same
requirement to complex patent litigation harms, rather than benefits,
the litigants and should give way to the blue-ribbon jury.
III. BENEFITS OF THE BLUE RIBBON JURy

"Honest to God, I don't see how you could try a patent
matter to a jury. Goodness, I've gotten involved in a few of

65.
66.

67.

68.
69.
70.

Id. at 220.
U.S. Census Bureau, Educational Attainment of the Population 18 Years and Over, by
Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 2012, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, tbl.1,
http://www .census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/20 12/tables.html
(last
revised Jan. 7,2013).
For example, if only those who have degrees above a baccalaureate are considered,
the percentage of eligible Americans drops by nearly two-thirds to just under 10% of
the popUlation. See id.
See Bertelsen, supra note 7, at 16-17 (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 296-97
(1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting)); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220.
See discussion infra Part III.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1986) (discussing the history of the
Equal Protection Clause as a basis for eliminating racially discriminatory jury
venires); see also Peter A. Detre, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in
the Composition of the Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L.J. 1913, 1927 (1994) ("Many courts
have recognized that what the fair cross-section guarantee protects is the defendant's
right to a fair chance at a representative jury.") (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78,100 (1970)).
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these things. It's like somebody hit you between your eyes
with a four-by-four. It's factually so complicated.,,71
A.

Technical Fields Develop Their Own Languages Rendering
Simplification ofIssues to Layman's Terms More Harmful Than
Beneficial

Recently, there has been a growth of linguistic study of highly
specialized scientific fields and the specialized languages developed
within them.72 Such specialized language is called a Language for
Special Purpose (LSP).73 Within these LSPs, specialized vocabulary
is a keystone feature. 74 As a result, speakers of the English language
will find themselves out of place listening to English speakers of a
technical field engaged in a discussion using that field's LSp. 75
Moreover, not only will an LSP have its own terminology, LSPs
"also have special ways of combining terms or of arranging
information that differ from the [Language for General Purpose].,,76
Communication between the LSP speaker and the non-expert is
fraught with incomplete understanding. When the LSP user must
communicate with a non-expert in the field-such as the expert
witness testifying before a lay jury-the expert is forced to use
general language rather than relying on the field's LSP to effectuate
communication. 77 As a result, "[t]he expert does not expect the nonexpert to achieve the same level of understanding of the terms used as
7l.

Judicial Panel Discussion on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1127, 1145
(1993) (quoting Covello, J., U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Connecticut,

72.

See SPECIALISED LANGUAGES IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: A MULTI-PERSPECTIVE
ApPROACH (Carmen Perez-Llantada & Maida Watson cds., 2011). The field is so

in response to a question regarding the use of juries in patent litigation).

73.

74.
75.

76.
77.

recent, in fact, that the First International Symposium on Languages for Specific
Purposes was held April 13-14, 2012, and a second conference convened in 2014.
University of Colorado Boulder, Second International Symposium on Languages for
Specific Purposes (Apr. 17-19, 2014) (an overview of the 2012 conference
proceedings and a preview of the 2014 conference program may be viewed at
http://aitec.colorado.edu/lsp/). As of 2013, the LSP Journal is only in its fourth
volume. 4 LSP JOURNAL 1 (2013).
LYNNE BOWKER & JENNIFER PEARSON, WORKING WITH SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO USING CORPORA 25 (2002).
Id. at 26.
"As an LGB [Language for General Purpose-i.e. the native English language]
speaker, you might feel a little out of your element if you overheard two
meteorologists discussing the weather using terms like 'advection', 'helicity', and
'radiational cooling'!" Id.
!d.
!d. at 28.
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long as the general idea is understood.,,78 However, when an expert
communicates with another expert or a semi-expert a fuller
understanding of the content of the communication can be reached. 79
Ultimately, it is important to know a field's LSP to properly and fully
explain the topic at hand. 80
As discussed above, the judicial system disqualifies jurors unable
to competently read and write the English language, recognizing the
fundamental requirement that, to render a fair decision, the juror must
be able to competently understand the facts at issue, the law being
presented, and the courtroom procedure. 81 With the rise of LSPs, the
English language is being broken into sub languages distinct and
nearly incomprehensible to the lay person not familiar with the
specialized language. 82 This makes the case for blue-ribbon juries
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.

/d. (emphasis added).
/d.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
For example, the following exchange took place in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM Corp.:
The Court: Do you know what demand substitutability is, [Juror
A]?
Juror A: Well, I would like to kind oflook into that.
The Court: Okay. And how about the barriers to entry, [Juror B)?
Juror B: I would have to read about it ....
The Court: All right. And how about reverse engineering, [Juror

C)?
Juror C: That's when you would take a product and you would
alter it in a, or modify it for your own purpose; that is, you would
reverse its function and use it in your own method.
The Court: And [Juror D), what is software?
Juror D: It's software.
The Court: Well, what is software?
Juror D: That's the paper software.
The Court: What's the hardware?
Juror D: That's the wires and hardware.
The Court: And what is-do you know what an interface is?
Juror D: Yes.
The Court: Can you give me an example of that?
Juror D: Well, if you take a blivet, tum it off one thing and drop it
down, its [sic] an interface change, right?
Kimberley A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365, 370-71 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Black Box] (emphasis added)
(quoting Rec. at 19,490-91, lLC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423
(N.D. Cal. 1978), afJ'd sub nom. on other grounds, Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d
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analogous to the due process protection requiring that jurors be able
to comprehend the English language. 83 Where a patent lawsuit takes
place between two experts in a highly specialized field, the case can
only be fully and truly decided by a discussion of the specific facts at
issue. Requiring the parties and the witnesses to generalize the
language and not rely on their LSP simplifies the proceedings to a
point that ultimately detracts from the substance of the case. 84 This is
greatly exacerbated by the minimum English-speaking requirement
for juror competency.85 When the LSP speaker is tasked with
simplifying complex terminology and principles to laymen's terms,
there is already a loss of deep and full understanding. 86 When this is
compounded by the listener who only has a basic understanding of
the general language, it is inevitable that full understanding is 10st.87
The use of a blue-ribbon jury may be the best way to overcome the
understanding limitation created by LSPs. With a blue-ribbon jury
deciding a patent infringement issue, the experts and parties can
explain the terms and distinctions of the patents at issue without
resorting to simplified, general language that fails to specifically and
wholly address the problem. In this way, blue-ribbon juries would
protect the constitutional right to jury trials and avoid the arbitrary
decision-making of a lay jury.
B.

Markman Took Interpretation ofPatent Language Away From
the Jury, Blue-Ribbon Juries Would Encourage Its Return
Frankly, I don't know why I'm so excited about trying to
bring this thing [patent suit] to closure. It goes to the Federal
Circuit afterwards. You know, it's hard to deal with things
that are ultimately resolved by people wearing propeller
hats. But we'll just have to see what happens when we give
it to them. I could say that with impunity because they've

1188
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

(9th Cir. 1980)).
See supra Part II.A.I.
See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 19.
See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
The theory "that our mother tongue restricts what we are able to think" has been
debunked in linguistics. Guy Deutscher, Does Your Language Shape How You
Think?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 29, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.coml20 I 0/08129/magazine/29Ianguaget.html?pagewanted=all&J=O. However, some research has shown that a language
using particular terms does imbue the speaker with a tendency perceive and make
sense of the world in a specific way consistent with those terms. Id.
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reversed everything I've ever done, so I expect fully they'll
reverse this, toO.88
1. The Markman Decision
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., Markman owned a
patent describing a system designed to track the movement of
clothing through the dry-clean process. 89 The independent issue in
the trial turned on the meaning of the term "inventory.,,9Q The jury
found that Westview infringed on Markman's patent. 91 Nevertheless,
the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for Westview,
reaching a different interpretation of the term "inventory.,,92
Markman appealed the district court's ruling as a matter of law,
arguing that interpretation of the claim was for the jury under the
Seventh Amendrnent. 93 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding. 94
In part, the Supreme Court decided that the "decisionrnaker vested
with the task of construing the patent is in the better position to
ascertain whether an expert's proposed definition fully comports with
the specification and claim and so will preserve the patent's internal
coherence.,,95 The Court stated that this furthers the policy goal of
ensuring uniformity in the treatment of a certain patent. 96 Claim
construction, the Court admitted, is rooted in "evidentiary
underpinnings,,,97 but is ultimately a "mongrel practice,,98 falling
between issues of law and fact. 99 The Court therefore concluded that
"submitting issues of document construction to juries" would be a
disservice to uniformity .100 In effect, according to the Supreme
Court, placing claim construction solely within the province of the

88.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Kimberley A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, District Court Judges]
(quoting 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No. 95-CV-113 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996) (Kent,
J.)).
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996).
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 391.
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judge serves a notice function to the populace by creating stability
through well-reasoned judge-made decisions.101
2. Markman's Ironic Twist

As a result of Markman, "a trial judge must determine as questions
of law the meaning of patent claims," which is a central issue in
patent litigation. 102 The cautious judge is then inclined to make a
ruling on disputed terms before trial and "may prudently enlist the aid
of qualified experts to determine the meaning of the [technical] claim
terms.,,103 A Markman hearing then becomes a mini-trial before the
main event. 104 Markman hearings typically employ experts and
require their own discovery issues and expert depositions before the
hearing takes place. 105
Ironically, while the Court in Markman intended to encourage
stability and provide notice of patent claims,I06 the result is a decision
on a claim that is reviewed de novo in the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals,107 and reversed roughly 40% of the time. lOS As a result, the
noble goal of providing certainty is undone by the very means
implemented to reach that end.
Meanwhile, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals enters a land of
"sophistry and fiction" when it states that trial judges, "in weighing
evidence and making credibility determinations," are only making
decisions as a matter of law.109 Inevitably, Markman hearings
become as much about weighing credibility and making evidentiary
determinations as any other factual inquiry. 110 The folly of the
Markman hearing has been summarized as
[t]he court and a bunch of lawyers get[ting] together. Not
one of them is a person of ordinary skill, or even mediocre
101. Id. at 390. See The Interpretation of Patent Claims, 32 AIPLA Q.J. I, 9-10 (2004)
(discussing the notice function of claims).
102. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 911 F. Supp. 76,79 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
103. Id.
104. Raymond P. Niro & Joseph N. Hosteny III, Markman: An Infringer's Delight; An
Inventor's Nightmare, 3 SEDONA CONF. 1. 69, 71-72 (2002).
105. Id.
106. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
107. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473-74 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane)
(Rader, J., dissenting in part).
108. Id. at 1476.
109. Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333 n.7 (D. Del.
1995).
110. Niro & Hosteny, supra note 104, at 78.
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or bad skill in the art. They then read-at least we hope they
do--a document intended by statute to be written for people
of skill in the art, so that the document need not include
what those of skill in the art would already know. This
makes as much sense as having an engineering paper
interpreted for the class by the "D" student, or someone who
hasn't even finished a year of engineering school. The
whole idea is malformed from the outset. III
In the end, the attempt to remove claim construction from the
province of the lay jury sought to better promote uniformity with the
hopes that a judge is better suited to make a determination of the use
of technical language. I 12 Instead, the result is nothing more than a
lack of finality to district court decision-making, causing some to
lament that "the effect of [Markman] is to make of the judicial
process a charade, for notwithstanding any trial level activity, [the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] will do pretty
much what its wants under it de novo retrial.,,113 The Federal Circuit
Markman court, in following that path, and the Supreme Court in
affirming it, ''jettisons more than two hundred years of jurisprudence
and eviscerates the role of the jury preserved by the Seventh
Amendment .... ,,114 This is so because, "while not technically a
dispositive ruling, claim construction can have outcomedeterminative effects," and "drastically affect the prospect of
settlement." I 15
3. The Blue-Ribbon Jury as an Alternative to Markman

Rather than eviscerate the Seventh Amendment, a blue-ribbon jury
is a better middle ground that reaches the desired end-goal of wellreasoned claim construction and stability of patent decisions. While
there are constitutional issues with implementing a blue-ribbon jury
system, I 16 straining one constitutional provision rather than
eviscerating it altogether is arguably the lesser of two evils.
The primary concern behind Markman hearings is the lay jury's
inability to come to a consistent interpretation of patent's terms.1I7 In
Ill. Id. (emphasis added).
112. See supra notes 95-10 1 and accompanying text.
113. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer,
J., concurring).
114. Id. at 989.
115. The Interpretation of Patent Claims, supra note 101, at 5.
116. See discussion supra Part m.
117. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
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response, the Markman Court made claim construction a matter of
law, "notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings," in the hopes of
saving uniformity.lI8 As a result, these hearings become mini-trials,
even including expert testimony to better enable a district court
judge, not steeped in the language of art,119 to make rulings on the
meaning of terms within a patent. On review, despite the goal of
uniformity, the judge's decision at law is subject to de novo review
with reversals occurring around 40% of the time. 120
The blue-ribbon jury solves many of these problems. On appeal,
the jury's determination of claim construction is subject to a highly
deferential standard, only being disturbed if a reasonable jury could
not reach the conclusion the trial jury did. 121 While this standard may
have its flaws when reviewing the interpretation of technical
language by a lay jury, the same cannot be said when the jury is
comprised of those reasonably skilled in the art of the patent at issue.
If the trial court judge is better skilled at syllogizing expert testimony
during Markman hearings than the lay jury during a trial, a fortiori, a
jury comprised of experts in the field of the patent at issue would be
even better equipped to determine the use of language in a patent.
The end result is a trial less at risk of erroneous decision-making
because the jury would be well-versed in the language at issue.
Presumably, blue-ribbon juries listening to expert testimony,
including the drafters of the patent and the purported infringers,
would clearly understand (certainly more so than the lay jury or
district court judge) the true intricacies of the issue and come to wellreasoned conclusions in light of the facts presented at trial. 122 Given
the critical appraisals of Markman hearings,123 blue-ribbon juries
present an alternative to putting judges in the position of fact-finder
vis a vis evidentiary determinations during a Markman hearing.
These determinations have the added benefit of being more stable at

118. Id.
119. See discussion supra Part lILA.
120. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
bane).
121. See Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229
F.R.D. 267, 281 (2005) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 25051 (1986)).
122. See discussion supra Part lILA.
123. See generally Niro & Hosteny, supra note 104 (discussing problems raised by the
Markman process).
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the appellate level-the motivation behind the Markman in the first
place. 124

C.

A Blue-Ribbon Juror is Better Able to Step into the Shoes of a
PHOSITA Than a District Court Judge

Nonobviousness is the standard against which a new patent is
measured to determine whether or not it sufficiently differs from
prior art in order to qualify for a patent. 125 Section 103 of the Patent
Act explains that:
[a] patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains. 126
Section 103 creates an inherent difficulty in resolving patent
claims-gaining access to the perspective of the person having
ordinarily skill in the art (PHOSITA).127 "The risk posed by
assigning the evaluation to a decisionmaker who does not have
ordinary skill in the art is that the [obviousness] bar will be set too
low.,,128
Obviousness, a fact-law inquiry, requires three steps: "(1)
articulat[ing] the legal standards; (2) identify[ing] the relevant facts;
and (3) apply[ing] the law to the facts.,,129 When this inquiry is tried
before the jury, the jury may make a finding as to obviousness
without any articulation of the facts that lead to such a conclusion. 130
Alternatively, a judicial determination of obviousness requires similar
findings of fact and the weighing of evidence. 131
As the procedure currently stands, it is not improper for a district
judge to submit the obviousness determination to the jury. 132
124.
125.
126.

127.
128.
129.

130.
131.
132.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 FJd 967, 989-91 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Mayer, J. concurring).
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective
ofPhosita, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 885 (2004).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V. 2012) (emphasis added).
See Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 885-87.
Id. at 888.
Wesley A. Demory, Note, Patent Claim Obviousness in Jury Trials: Where's the
Analysis?, 6 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 449, 458 (2011).
Id.
See id.
Jd. at 460.
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However, as per Graham v. John Deere CO.,133 and KSR International
Co. v. Telejlex, Inc./ 34 should the district court submit to the jury the
question of obviousness, the district court still has the responsibility
of reviewing the jury verdict. \35 However, the reality is that by
requiring the district court judge to make a determination from the
point of view of the PHOSITA, "the district court judge must attempt
to step in the shoes of a person skilled in the technical field of the
patented invention and determine from that vantage point what the
terminology in the patent claims means.,,136
In Robotic Vision Systems, Inc. v. View Engineering, Inc.,137 the
district court judge donned the shoes of an engineer with an
integrated circuit background with those skills and degrees to
interpret, as an engineer would, the terms "providing ... fiducials,"
"correlated ... heights," "disposing ... in a prearranged pattern," and
"restricting ... to a predetermined range of heights.,,138 Few, if any,
district court judges actually have a background to make a
determination of these terms sua sponte, and, like in the Markman
hearings,139 the judge must obtain, weigh, analyze, and appraise
extraneous evidence including, but not limited to, treatises, dictionary
definitions, and expert testimony.14o
Probably as a result of the inability for an individual unlearned,
unskilled, and untrained in a highly technical field to pretend to be
otherwise, the role of the PHOSITA has become marginalized in
judicial decision-making. 141 "This approach has left the courts with
considerabie room for active judicial review ... [and] has arguably
disregarded the statutory language and permitted the issuance of
patents on routine advances within easy reach of technological
practitioners of ordinary skill.,,142 The relevance of the PHOSITA, a
statutory requirement, has been further lowered by the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeal's determination that "obviousness" is a legal
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
Demory, supra note 129, at 460.
Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 88, at 6 (citing Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc.
v. Avia Grp. Int'l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 88, at 6. (quoting Robotic Vision Sys., Inc.,
189 F.3d at 1375)).
See discussion supra Part III.B.
Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 88, at 7.
See Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 889 (discussing the diminishing role of the
PHOSITA in judicial decisions).
Id. at 889-90.
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conclusion and therefore not granted the same level of deference as is
a finding of fact. 143 Furthermore, PHOSITA's relevance has been
mitigated by the Federal Circuit's elevation of the use of nontechnical
evidence to being on par with the technical examination relevant to
the statutory PHOSITA inquiry.l44 The result is a move away from
the statutorily set level of inquiry due to the inability of the
factfinder, whether judge or jury, to properly and legitimately put
itself in the shoes of someone well-versed in the field at issue. 145
Submitting the question of obviousness to a blue-ribbon jury
obviates the difficulties lay persons have putting themselves in the
mind of someone with advanced, technical expertise,146 with the
added benefit of finality to the ruling. 147 When a juror is asked to
place himself in the shoes of a reasonable person, say, in the
determination of negligence, it is generally well accepted that jurors
are able to play the fictional role of the reasonable person because
they can "draw on their own understanding of reasonable behavior,
based on their experience of the world.,,148 The same can be said for
the judge. This is diametrically opposed to either the judge or juror
placing himself in the shoes of a PHOSITA. The requirement that
the individual pretend to be a person highly skilled in a technical field
forecloses the ability to rely on one's every day experiences unless
that person is highly skilled in the same or similar area. 149
The PHOSITA in Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell
Technology Group, Ltd.,150 had a master's degree in electrical
engineering. lSI The juror, who statistically speaking is unlikely to
even have a bachelor's degree,J52 must put himself in the shoes of a
reasonable person having a master's degree. Not only that, but the

143. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 705 F.2d
1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
144. See Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 893.
145. See id. at 896-97.
146. See Deutscher, supra note 87, (explaining that understanding the world through a
certain language, like an LSP, leads the individual to understand the world around
them in regard to that particular approach). Inevitably, the result is that experts in a
particular field are better attuned to the intricacies of the field and able to place
themselves in the shoes of a PHOSITA. See discussion supra Part III.A.
147. This is similar to the discussion regarding Markman hearings. See supra Part II1.B.
148. Steven Hetcher, The Jury's Out: Social Norms' Misunderstood Role in Negligence
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633,654 (2003).
149. See discussion supra Part lILA.
150. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 09-290,2010 WL 3937157,
at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 1,2010).
151. Id. at *6.
152. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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inquiry as a PHOSITA is done at the time the patent application is
submitted. 153 It is all but impossible to presume that a layman,
without any training in a particularized field, can gain the requisite
knowledge of the PHOSITA merely through expert testimony (likely
to be far less informative than a lecture)154 and a reading of material
on the subject. If the average person is able to fill the shoes of a
"reasonable person," it is only logical that the PHOSITA is best
attained by one already having knowledge in the field at issue. A
jury drawn from individuals trained in the area to which the patent
applies would be far better suited to assuming the role of PHOSITA
than the lay person.
This more rational conclusion has the added benefit of being less
likely to be overturned on appeal. For one, as a finding of fact, a
higher review standard would apply.155 More importantly, though,
the blue-ribbon jury steeped in the language of the field would,
presumably, be able to render decisions based on individual issues at
trial, leaving a cleaner record for the appellate COurt. 156
D. Blue Ribbon Juries are More Likely to Properly Follow the Trial
Court's Jury Instructions

In criminal cases, trial courts are permitted to empanel "deathqualified juries.,,157 Death-qualified juries are juries "fit to decide a
case involving the death penalty because the jurors have no absolute
ideological bias against capital punishment.,,158 The basis for these
juries, according to Justice Stewart, is that the juror must be able to,
at minimum, consider the instructions given by the judge under the
applicable law. 159 In Wainwright v. Witt,160 the Court clarified that
the inquiry is "whether the juror's views would 'prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath. ",161 The upshot is that

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V 2012) (delineating that the PHOSITA standard applies
"before the effective filing date").
See discussion of LSPs, supra Part lILA (indicating that the expert cannot even
communicate to the lay person the full depth of the expert's knowledge).
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Cf Moore, Black Box, supra note 82, at 368 (discussing the lay jury's tendency to fail
to decide discrete issues).
See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 516-18 (1968) and its progeny.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,supra note 8, at 424.
See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (1968).
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,45 (1980)).
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proper jury decision-making requires the dismissal of a juror who
"would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.,,162
The requirement that jurors be able to impartially apply the law in
the case of death-qualified juries is analogous to this Comment's call
for blue-ribbon juries. When a juror is unable to comprehend the
facts and instructions of the case,163 it is a foregone conclusion that
the juror will be hard pressed to faithfully apply the laws of patents,
by putting him or herself in the shoes of a PHOSITA. I64 Inevitably,
the result is likely a decision not in-line with the court's instruction. 165
Furthermore, once the patent juror is unable to follow the court's
instruction, or the facts at issue, she may base her decision on
"emotional or other irrelevant factors."I66 The jury's decision is more
likely to be based on sympathy for David as he squares off against
Goliath,167 than it is to be based on a full understanding of the facts at
issue. 168 As is the fear that allows death-qualified juries, patent jurors
may enter the jury box irretrievably vested on one party's side
because the juror is unable to follow trial proceedings and the court's
instructions.
The blue-ribbon jury could effectively fill an analogous roll to the
death-qualified jury. By using blue-ribbon juries in patent litigation,
the juror is far more likely to understand the legal task at hand and
reach a decision based on the facts of the case and the court's
instructions. 169 This is particularly so when the juror is asked to
162.
163.
164.
165.

166.

167.

168.
169.

Id. at 425-426.
See supra note 82.
See PHOSITA discussion supra Part III.C.
See Moore, Black Box, supra note 82, at 368 ("[J]uries tend to decide whole suits
rather than delineate individual issues, even when separate issues are presented to
them via special verdict forms or interrogatories.").
Id. at 372 (citing Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial, CHI. TRIB., June 12,
1995, http://articles.chicagotribune.comJI995-06-12lbusiness/9506120025_1-'patentcases-patent-suit-jury-trial).
See Jonathon Taylor Reavill, Note, Tipping the Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape
of Equity in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 319, 366 (1996)
("[J]uries also tend to idealize inventors. Before the jury is a plaintiff who, in using
her talent, skills, and effort to invent something, has received the recognition of the
United States of America. Such a person may inspire awe and therefore bias jurors in
her favor.") (citation omitted); see also Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial,
supra note 166 (reporting on Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 902 F. Supp. 330
(E.D.N.Y. 1995), ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997) in which
inventor Dr. Raymond Damadian sued corporate giant General Electric Co. for
infringement of Dr. Damadian's patent covering a means of detecting potentially
cancerous tumors through magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology).
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part lILA.
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assume the position of a PHOSITA.l7O Just as the death-qualified
juror is able to reach a decision for or against the death penalty,171 the
blue-ribbon juror is able to place herself in the shoes of a
PHOSITA.l72 The lay juror, however, cannot seriously be expected
to place herself in the shoes of the reasonable inventor who-depending on the patent-may possess master's degrees in advanced
scientific fields. Excluding the lay juror from such inquiries serves
the same ends as excluding the juror who cannot possibly agree to a
death sentence--ensuring that the juror can follow instructions from
the COurt. 173 Blue-ribbon juries allow for better decisions in complex
patent litigation and should be used for that purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fifty-six percent of patent claims that went to trial in the year prior
to September 2011 were tried by jury. 174 However, jurors likely are
unable to fully rationalize the complexity of the patent before them, 175
depriving citizens of the freedom from arbitrary decision-making. 176
Lay jurors put patent litigants at risk of reaching such arbitrary
decisions. 177
The implementation of blue-ribbon juries might ensure that those
patent claims be decided in a non-arbitrary manner,178 but it must
overcome the fair-cross section requirement. 179 This slight harm, the
result of a rule rooted in protecting a criminal defendant,180 should be
acceptable for an alternative juror selection process that solves more
lRl
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